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Abstract
■ The elements most vivid in our conscious awareness are the
ones to which we direct our attention. Scientific study confirms
the impression of a close bond between selective attention and
visual awareness, yet the nature of this association remains elu-
sive. Using visual afterimages as an index, we investigate neural
processing of stimuli as they enter awareness and as they become
the object of attention. We find evidence of response enhance-
ment accompanying both attention and awareness, both in the
phase-sensitive neural channels characteristic of early processing
stages and in the phase-insensitive channels typical of higher cor-
tical areas. The effects of attention and awareness on phase-
insensitive responses are positively correlated, but in the same
experiments, we observe no correlation between the effects on
phase-sensitive responses. This indicates independent signa-
tures of attention and awareness in early visual areas yet a conver-
gence of their effects at more advanced processing stages. ■
INTRODUCTION
Selective attention and visual awareness seem to go hand
in hand: the contents of our visual awareness are strongly
dominated by the objects to which we attend. By the same
token, salient visual stimuli may fail to reach awareness
when attention is impaired, either experimentally (Simons
& Chabris, 1999; Mack & Rock, 1998) or pathologically
(Driver & Vuilleumier, 2001). On a neural level, cortical re-
sponses to a visual stimulus are often enhanced when that
stimulus is the object of attention (e.g., Treue & Maunsell,
1996; Motter, 1993; Moran & Desimone, 1985) and simi-
larly when that stimulus reaches conscious awareness
(e.g., Grunewald, Bradley, & Andersen, 2002; Leopold &
Logothetis, 1996; Logothetis & Schall, 1989), further rein-
forcing the parallel between the two phenomena.
This partnership between attention and awareness,
however, is not inviolable (Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007;
Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006;
Lamme, 2003; Tong, 2003; Crick & Koch, 1998). When ex-
perimental manipulations, such as masking, erase a visual
stimulus from an observerʼs awareness, the instruction to
pay attention to the location or features of the unper-
ceived stimulus can still produce a measurable boost in
its processing, indicating effective attention without
awareness (Shin, Stolte, & Chong, 2009; Bahrami, Lavie,
& Rees, 2007; Kanai, Tsuchiya, & Verstraten, 2006;
Montaser-Kouhsari & Rajimehr, 2005). Conversely, some
stimulus aspects, such as color, can be perceived while at-
tention is engaged elsewhere (Braun & Julesz, 1998; Rock,
Linnett, Grant, & Mack, 1992). In terms of the firing behav-
ior of visual neurons, the overall similarity between atten-
tion and awareness is less compelling within the primary
visual cortex (V1) and the LGN. Within these early stages
of visual processing, attention robustly modulates neural
firing (Mcalonan, Cavanaugh, & Wurtz, 2008; McAdams
& Reid, 2005; Ito & Gilbert, 1999; Roelfsema, Lamme,
& Spekreijse, 1998; Motter, 1993), whereas awareness-
related response modulation is weak (V1; Maier et al.,
2008; Wilke, Logothetis, & Leopold, 2006; Leopold &
Logothetis, 1996) or absent (LGN; Lehky & Maunsell,
1996; see also Sengpiel, Blakemore, & Harrad, 1995).
The signatures of attention and awareness in the early
visual brain thus appear distinct in terms of neural firing
activity. It deserves mention that fMRI studies do show
hemodynamic changes accompanying awareness manipu-
lations in these early areas (Haynes, Deichmann, & Rees,
2005; Wunderlich, Schneider, & Kastner, 2005; Tong &
Engel, 2001; Polonsky, Blake, Braun, & Heeger, 2000), a
distinction between fMRI and neurophysiology that wewill
return to in the Discussion section. Perhaps the most di-
rect demonstration of a separation between attention
and awareness is their opposite effects on the formation
of negative afterimages (Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007). Being
aware of a visual stimulus causes that stimulus to leave a
stronger afterimage (Gilroy & Blake, 2005; Tsuchiya &
Koch, 2005), whereas attending to a stimulus results in
its producing a weaker afterimage (Wede & Francis,
2007; Suzuki & Grabowecky, 2003).
The view of attention and awareness as closely asso-
ciated yet separable phenomena invites the question of
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how the two are related. In particular, we wondered how
their separate natures are expressed in empirical observa-
tions made while manipulating either attention or aware-
ness experimentally. Does the similarity between the
neural concomitants of impairing either attention or
awareness observed in many higher visual brain areas re-
flect their fundamental association? If so, what does it
mean when this similarity in neural concomitants is wea-
kened in early visual areas? And finally, how can the neural
signatures of attention and awareness become so dispa-
rate as to yield opposite effects on a perceptual phenom-
enon so basic as the formation of visual afterimages?
To address these related questions, we developed a new
psychophysical technique. Although staying close to
known behavioral paradigms used in research on attention
and awareness, this technique is exceptional in that it al-
lows perceptual effects of attention and awareness to be
traced back to the activity of specific classes of visual neu-
rons: those sensitive to spatial phase and those insensitive
to spatial phase. This specificity may prove revealing be-
cause phase sensitivity is characteristic of early visual areas
such as LGN and V1 (e.g., Levitt, Schumer, Sherman,
Spear, & Movshon, 2001; Hubel & Wiesel, 1968), where
the neural signatures of selective attention and visual
awareness differ most. Moreover, as detailed below, the
striking effects of attention and awareness on the forma-
tion of afterimages may hinge on distinct contributions
of phase-sensitive and phase-insensitive neurons, which
can now be addressed. Our approach is furthermore char-
acterized by maximally similar stimuli and methods used
during both attention and awareness manipulations. This
allows us to go beyond a qualitative comparison between
the effects of attention and awareness and look for closer
associations.
METHODS
Apparatus and Observers
Seven observers, four naive, participated in our experi-
ments. Observers were seated in a darkened room
and viewed visual stimuli on a gamma-linearized 1280 ×
960 pixels CRT screen with a refresh rate of 120 Hz,
through a mirror stereoscope at a visual distance of
81 cm. Background luminance and mean stimulus lumi-
nance were 43.5 cd/m2. Observers were instructed to al-
ways keep their eyes directed at a white (87.0 cd/m2)
fixation dot (radius = 0.04°) positioned in the center of a
finely drawn circular edge (87.0 cd/m2; radius= 6.0°) to aid
fusion.
Main Experiment
A commonly applied classification of visual neurons, dating
back to the seminal work by Hubel and Wiesel (1962) and,
subsequently, Enroth-Cugell and Robson (1966), is that of
phase-sensitive and phase-insensitive cells. Phase-sensitive
neurons are characterized by their selectivity for the ex-
act positioning of a stimulus within their receptive field.
If the stimulus is a conventional sine-wave grating, this re-
sults in sensitivity to the spatial phase of the grating. A
phase-sensitive neuron will respond to a given stimulus
if it is presented at a particular, optimal, location within
the neuronʼs receptive field but will decrease its response
when the positioning within the receptive field changes.
Neurons in the second category, phase-insensitive neu-
rons, respond to an appropriate stimulus irrespective of
its exact positioning within the receptive field. Although
the degree of phase sensitivity may vary continuously within
a given neural population (e.g., Levitt et al., 2001), it is useful
to think of phase-sensitive and phase-insensitive cells as
distinct categories when conceptualizing neural events
that underlie vision (e.g., Hubel & Wiesel, 1962). Similarly,
and although we acknowledge the nuances that apply, we
will for clarity refer simply to “phase-sensitive cells” and
“phase-insensitive cells” within the context of the present
work.
Phase sensitivity is a hallmark of early stages of visual
processing, being strong in primates subcortically (White,
Sun, Swanson, & Lee, 2002; Levitt et al., 2001; Xu et al.,
2001) and in the category of simple cells in V1 (Hubel &
Wiesel, 1962). Phase insensitivity, conversely, is pro-
nounced in extrastriate visual cortex (Levitt, Kiper, &
Movshon, 1994; Maunsell & Van Essen, 1983) and in V1
complex cells (Hubel & Wiesel, 1962), but it is weak
subcortically.
Our method was designed to independently evaluate
perceptual manifestations of phase-sensitive cell activity
and of phase-insensitive cell activity, without these sepa-
rate effects getting entangled. Psychophysical methods
do not ordinarily provide separate windows on the activity
of both kinds of neural populations, as perception relies
on both classes of neurons. Here we achieve a separation,
however, by combining two classic psychophysical phe-
nomena in a newmanner. The two phenomena are thresh-
old elevation and negative afterimages. Both reflect
adaptation that accompanies neural responses to visual
stimulation. They therefore provide a window on neural
activity associated with vision. Neither by itself, however,
allows this activity to be pinpointed to a particular neural
class. Threshold elevation refers to impaired visual detec-
tion of a pattern following prolonged inspection of that or
a similar pattern (e.g., Blakemore & Campbell, 1969). It is
arguably associated with adaptation of various neural pop-
ulations, both phase sensitive and phase insensitive (e.g.,
Burbeck, 1986; Smith, 1977). Afterimages are the illusory
“photo negatives” onemay perceive after prolonged expo-
sure to unchanging visual input, for instance a dark spot
that is perceived for some time after staring at a light bulb.
Classic work has provided evidence that part of the adap-
tation underlying afterimages occurs in the retinal photo-
receptors (Sakitt, 1976; Brindley, 1962; Craik, 1940),
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prompting the textbook view of afterimages as an exclu-
sively retinal phenomenon. More recent work, however,
has identified contributions of adaptation at more cen-
tral locations as well, including the visual cortex itself
(Gilroy & Blake, 2005; Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005; Suzuki &
Grabowecky, 2003; Shimojo, Kamitani, & Nishida, 2001;
Anstis, Rogers, & Henry, 1978; Virsu & Laurinen, 1977).
Afterimages and threshold elevation are each otherʼs
complement, in the sense that afterimages constitute per-
ception of something that is not there, whereas threshold
elevation causes a failure to perceive something that is
there. This complementary relation plays a central role
in the method we devised. As elaborated in the next para-
graph, afterimages likely arise at processing stages that are
sensitive to spatial phase, after which their neural signal
may pass through phase-insensitive stages (Wede& Francis,
2007; Suzuki & Grabowecky, 2003; see also Alonso &
Martinez, 1998). The latter, although not the basis of after-
images, domodulate afterimage visibility. Following this rea-
soning, the “true” strength of an afterimage at its neural
source forms a probe into adaptation at phase-sensitive pro-
cessing stages. Phase-insensitive adaptation, on the other
hand, ismanifested in the component of threshold elevation
that impairs the visibility of an afterimageonce it has formed.
The obvious difficulty is to distinguish these two contribu-
tions on the basis of the phenomenal experience of after-
images. This is what our method was designed to do.
From the outset we acknowledge that perceptual exper-
iments such as ours do not measure responses of neurons
directly. Still, it is possible to infer response properties of
neurons that underlie the perceptual effects we measure,
and this is a principle aim of our study. Accordingly, in the
rest of this article, we will for sake of clarity refer to “phase-
sensitive channels” and “phase-insensitive channels,” thus
drawing a parallel with this widely used classification of
visual neurons in neurophysiology while reminding the
reader of the distinction between the neural activity and
the perceptual outcome we measure.
An origin of afterimages in phase-sensitive channels can
be inferred from the nature of afterimages as “photo nega-
tives” of their physical inducers, having the same spatial
location and opposite spatial phase. These characteristics
require an origin in channels whose response in fact varies
with spatial phase. That phase-insensitive channels can
and do modulate the visibility of an afterimage follows
from the finding that static inducers simultaneously cause
afterimages as well as threshold elevation that impairs the
visibility of those same afterimages (Wede& Francis, 2007;
Suzuki & Grabowecky, 2003; Georgeson & Turner, 1985).
This component of threshold elevation necessarily arises
in phase-insensitive channels because no phase-sensitive
channel that adapts to the inducing image can also be in-
volved in detecting the subsequent afterimage, for the in-
ducer and the afterimage are of opposite phase.
We developed a method built on signal detection theory
to simultaneously gauge both the “true strength” of an
afterimage before it passes throughphase-insensitive stages
and the strength of the component of threshold elevation
that impairs afterimage visibility to an observer. We use
these two measures to gauge the adaptation state of phase-
sensitive and phase-insensitive channels, respectively.
Figure 1A, left, shows a typical trial sequence. Observers
maintained strict fixation while a stationary “inducing”
grating (0.67 Michelson contrast), windowed by a Gaussian
aperture (σ = 0.68°), was presented for 4 sec; a period of
stimulation that is sufficient to induce both an afterimage
and an elevation in threshold. At the end of this 4-sec in-
duction period, the fixation dot turned from white to red
and the inducing grating was ramped off (over 250 msec)
into a “nulling” grating, designed to cancel the afterimage
as it arose. This nulling image was a negative of the after-
image or, in other words, a low-contrast version of the in-
ducing grating itself. A mask pattern subsequently replaced
the nulling grating 1 sec after its appearance. This moment
was marked by a tone. In cases where a nulling grating like
ours is approximately comparable in strength to the after-
image it is designed to cancel, neither the afterimage nor
the nulling grating is seen when the two are superimposed,
the perceptual result being nothing but a blank screen
(Kelly & Martinez-Uriegas, 1993; Georgeson & Turner, 1985;
Leguire & Blake, 1982). We quantified this by asking ob-
servers whether a grating was visible the moment before the
mask appearedor, in otherwords,whether themask replaced
a grating or a blank screen in their perception. The clear tem-
poral separation between the color change of the fixation dot
at the end of the inducer period and the auditory signal that
marked the perceptual task 1 sec later minimized the possi-
bility of mistaking the inducer grating itself for an imperfectly
canceled afterimage during this task. Observers were in-
structed to ignore perceptual changes, if any, thatmight occur
during the second leading up to the task.
Over repeated trials, we varied the contrast of the null-
ing grating to generate the sort of response pattern shown
in Figure 1A, right. Observers reported perceiving a grating
both when the nulling image was very weak and when it
was relatively strong. In the former case, it was the after-
image that was seen whereas in the latter case it was the
nulling image itself that was seen, as symbolized by the gra-
dient displayed above the plot. Between these extremes
lies a range of nuller contrasts where observers frequently
reported stimulus absence, leading to a U-shaped curve.
The low central region of this curve corresponds to nuller
strengths that are similar to the afterimage strength, result-
ing in near-perfect cancellation. (As is true for all detection
tasks, the underlying psychometric function does not
bend sharply but, instead, gradually.)
The location of the center of this U-shape is our first
variable of interest. It provides a measure of the “true”
afterimage strength that is not influenced by threshold ele-
vation, that is, before passage through phase-insensitive
stages (Figure 1B, left). Certainly, whether a particular
combination of nuller and afterimage is detected depends
on threshold elevation. However, this is true both when
the nuller is weaker than the afterimage, determining
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the left leg of the curve, and when the nuller is stronger
than the afterimage, determining the right leg. We per-
formed a control experiment to confirm such a symmetri-
cal influence of threshold elevation on both sides of the
curve and thus its irrelevance for the location of its center
(see Appendix). Threshold elevation, conversely, is re-
flected in the distance between the left and right leg of
the U-shape; our second variable of interest. In the pre-
sence of threshold elevation, a larger deviation between
the strength of the afterimage and the nuller is required
for their combination to be detected, leading to wider U-
curves (Figure 1B, middle). Figure 1B, right, illustrates the
influence of internal noise, the final parameter shaping the
detection curve but otherwise not relevant for our analyses.
Wequantified both the location of the center of theU-shape
and the width of the U-shape by fitting the function P(CN,
CD)= 1−Φ∣CN− CA∣,σ (CD) to detection data from each con-
dition and observer separately. Here P(CN, CD) is the prob-
ability of detection given nuller contrast CN and contrast
detection threshold CD, Φ is a cumulative Gaussian func-
tion, CA is true afterimage contrast, and σ is the standard
deviation of the Gaussian (see Appendix for derivation).
In this manner, we thus obtained estimates of both the true
afterimage contrast at its neural origin and the contrast de-
tection threshold.
Observers performed the nulling task for four different,
randomly interleaved conditions designed to manipulate
attention and awareness (Figure 1C), indicated by a letter
at the start of each trial. In the two “attention” conditions,
observers directed their attention (but not their fixation)
either toward the inducing grating, which was presented
outside fixation, or toward the fixation point while ignor-
ing the inducing grating. In the two “awareness” condi-
tions, the inducing grating was presented monocularly
and either with or without an incompatible pattern pre-
sented at the same location in theother eye. For this purpose,
we used a checkerboard pattern with black (∼0 cd/m2)
and white (87.0 cd/m2) square checks of side 0.15°,
windowed using a Gaussian aperture (σ = 0.75°). The
pattern reversed contrast polarity every 100 msec and
Figure 1. Experimental
method. (A) Basic trial
sequence (left). Observers
viewed a sine wave grating for
4 sec while keeping steady
fixation. Then, as the fixation
dot changed color, this inducing
grating was replaced with a
“nulling” grating designed to
cancel the inducerʼs afterimage.
One second later this nuller was
replaced with a mask at the
sound of a tone. The nullerʼs
contrast was systematically
varied between trials. Observers
reported on every trial whether
they saw a grating at the
location of the nulling grating,
the instant before the mask
appeared. The plot on the
right shows a typical response
pattern. Observers perceive a
grating (the afterimage) when
the nuller is weak and they
also perceive a grating (the
nuller itself ) when the nuller
is relatively strong. At
intermediate nuller contrasts,
however, the nuller and the
afterimage cancel out and
observers often do not perceive
any grating. (B) Interpretation
of the data (see text for details).
The location of the U-shaped
detection curve indicates the
“true contrast” of the
afterimage, which is associated
with adaptation of phase-sensitive channels (left). The width of the U-shaped detection curve provides a measure of contrast detection threshold
and is interpreted as a measure of adaptation in phase-insensitive channels (middle). The slope of the curveʼs legs is associated with the level
of internal noise (right). (C) Manipulation of attention and awareness. To vary the degree of attention allocation to the inducing grating
observers were instructed to attend either the grating or a fixation dot located elsewhere (left). To modulate awareness of the inducing grating,
it either was or was not rendered invisible using interocular suppression (right).
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revolved 1° around its center every 10 msec, in a direc-
tion that was chosen randomly every trial. The high con-
trast and dynamic nature of this pattern ensured that the
inducing grating was rendered invisible to the observer,
who perceived only the dynamic suppressor (Tsuchiya &
Koch, 2005). The suppressor, like the inducer, was ramped
off over 250 msec at the end of the adaptation period.
To facilitate comparison between manipulations of at-
tention and awareness, the stimulus layout was identical
for all four conditions; that is, on every trial, the inducing
grating was presented to only one randomly chosen eye
and always at the same eccentricity (2.8°). Moreover, by
confining the perceptual judgment of grating presence
or absence to the very last moment before mask onset in
the manner described above, we ensured ample time for
observers to direct their attention to the location of the
nuller (a full second between the moment the fixation
dot changed color and themoment the tone sounded), re-
gardless of the attention instructions that applied while
the inducer was present. To further ensure maximal simi-
larity between the four conditions and also to keep task
demand at a moderate level, we chose not to include addi-
tional tasks for controlling observersʼ attention during
adaptation. Previous work has shown mere attention in-
structions to be adequate in similar paradigms (Suzuki &
Grabowecky, 2003), as confirmed by the fact that our at-
tention manipulations yielded significant effects. For the
same reasons, we did not ask observers to monitor the
effectiveness of perceptual suppression on-line. Instead,
we performed a separate experiment beforehand using
the same stimuli, establishing that for these observers per-
ceptual suppression was broken less than 0.5% of the time.
The angular position of the inducer shifted clockwise by
45° on every consecutive trial to avoid between-trial buildup
of adaptation. Thenulling gratingwas presented to the same
eye as the inducer. Following indications that afterimage
formation may depend on the spatial frequency of the in-
ducing grating (e.g., Georgeson& Turner, 1985; Leguire &
Blake, 1982), we performed our experiment at three differ-
ent spatial frequencies (0.66, 2.0, or 3.3 cycles/degree).
Fits were obtained by minimizing the sum of squared
errors using a Levenberg–Marquardt algorithm. Occasion-
ally, detection data would not display a clear dip in the
center of the U-shape, presumably because eye move-
ments had disrupted the nulling method or because the
dip was narrow and fell between the nuller contrasts we
sampled. The 8 of 84 cases in which this happened were
characterized by fits that converged on a negative value
for the detection threshold. These were not included in
our analyses.
Adaptation to the Suppressor
We performed a control experiment to investigate the ef-
fect of adaptation to the suppressor on threshold elevation
in the absence of an inducer. Here observers were ex-
posed to a suppressor pattern in isolation and subse-
quently reported detection of a physical grating. This
condition was paired with a baseline condition in which
the suppressor pattern was replaced by nothing but a
blank screen, followed by the same detection task. The stim-
ulus dimensions and trial structure of this experiment
were identical to those of the main experiment, and from
an observerʼs perspective, the condition with a suppressor
in isolation was identical to the main experiment condition
including a suppressor and an inducer. The only addition
was a white dial (87.0 cd/m2; length = 0.13°) extending
from fixation during adaptation to indicate target location,
which was not necessarily obvious in trials with neither an
inducer nor a suppressor. Detection targets were pre-
sented monocularly to the eye contralateral to the sup-
pressor, if present.
Afterimage Duration
Finally, we performed an experiment measuring the per-
ceived duration of afterimages following exposure to an in-
ducer. Stimuli and trial structure were again identical to
those of our main experiment, except that no nuller was
presented, and the nulling task was replaced by a judg-
ment of afterimage duration. In addition, we added an in-
ducer spatial frequency of 4.6 cycles/degree, resulting in
four different frequencies in total. Inducers of such a high
spatial frequency do not lend themselves well to nulling
tasks, which require an exact overlap between the nuller
and the afterimage, but they are suitable for duration
measures.
RESULTS
Effects on Phase-sensitive Channels
Figure 2 shows the results of the attention conditions (left
column) and the awareness conditions (right column).
By means of illustration, Figure 2A displays the raw out-
come (dots) for one combination of observer and spatial
frequency as well as the fitted curves. It can be seen that
the width and the position of the curve are influenced,
both by attending to the inducer (left panel; light curve
vs. dark curve) and by being aware of the inducer (right
panel; light curve vs. dark curve). To highlight how this af-
fects the variables of interest, the bars drawn on the x-axis
indicate in corresponding colors the locations of the cen-
ters of the U-shaped curves as well as intervals that span
one detection threshold to both sides of each center. We
note that, in these examples, the effects of attention and
awareness on the left leg of the U-shape seem small. This
is because the symmetrical increase in curve width, caused
by threshold elevation (Figure 1B,middlepanel), is counter-
acted in this region by the overall rightward shift that oc-
curs simultaneously (Figure 1B, left panel). We performed
a control experiment (see Appendix) that rules out an
alternative explanation, that threshold elevation would in-
crease curve width asymmetrically on only the right side.
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Figure 2B summarizes effects on the center position,
averaged over all seven observers. Because this position
denotes the contrast of the afterimage before any effects
of threshold elevation (Figure 1B, left panel), we will re-
fer to it as “true afterimage contrast.” A rightward shift of
the center position corresponds to an increase in this
true contrast, whereas a leftward shift denotes a de-
crease. The left panel of Figure 2B shows that directing
attention to the inducing grating tends to increase the
true contrast of its afterimage ( y-axis). This trend is con-
sistent across three different inducer spatial frequencies
(x-axis) and significant when combining across spatial
frequencies, ANOVA with factors spatial frequency (n =
3) and attention condition (n = 2), F = 6.2 and p < .01
for the latter factor. Figure 2B, right panel, shows a similar
result for the awareness manipulation, with a significantly
higher true afterimage contrast following a visible inducing
grating than following a perceptually suppressed grating,
ANOVA with factors spatial frequency (n = 3) and aware-
ness condition (n= 2), F= 83.0 and p≪ .01 for the latter
factor. As afterimage formation can be attributed to adap-
tation of phase-sensitive channels, these results indicate
that the inducing gratings cause more adaptation in
phase-sensitive channels, both when the gratings are at-
tended and when they are consciously perceived.
Effects on Phase-insensitive Channels
Figure 2C shows the accompanying effects observed in
these same experiments on the width of the U-shaped
Figure 2. Result of the main
experiment. (A) Effects of
manipulating attention (left)
and awareness (right) on the
outcome of our nulling task for
one observer and one inducer
spatial frequency. Dots are
empirical data points; curves
show the fits on which we base
our further analyses. Both
attention and awareness
influence the position and
width of the detection curve,
as summarized by the position
and width of the bars drawn
on the x-axis. (B) The true
contrast of the afterimage,
measured by the position of
the U-shaped detection curve,
averaged over all seven
observers. The true contrast
increases when attention is
allocated to the inducing grating
(left; light vs. dark curve) and
also when the inducing grating
reaches conscious awareness
(right; light vs. dark curve).
This is true for all inducer
spatial frequencies tested
(x-axis). (C) Observer-averaged
contrast detection thresholds,
measured by the width of the
U-shaped detection curve,
are more elevated following
attention to the inducing
grating (left; light curve) than
following attention to the
fixation point (left; dark curve).
Perceptually suppressing the
inducing grating, on the other
hand, has a weaker effect that
varies with inducer spatial
frequency (right).
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curve (Figure 1B, middle panel). This variable reflects the
contrast difference between afterimage and nuller image
that is required for an observer to detect their combined
sum (Figure 1A, right panel), thus providing a measure of
contrast detection threshold. The left panel shows that
contrast detection thresholds ( y-axis) are significantly
higher following adaptation to a grating that is attended
than to a grating that is not attended, ANOVA with factors
spatial frequency (n= 3) and attention condition (n= 2),
F = 8.5 and p < .01 for the latter factor.
The right panel of Figure 2C shows how perceptual
suppression of our inducing grating affected subsequent
contrast detection thresholds. The pattern of results is
quite different from that observed for the attention ma-
nipulation (left panel). Here, the effects on contrast de-
tection threshold are smaller, and they vary across spatial
frequencies of the inducing grating. At a low spatial fre-
quency perceptual suppression tends to increase contrast
detection thresholds (leftmost pair of points), whereas at
higher spatial frequencies detection thresholds tend to
be reduced following perceptual suppression (middle
and right pairs of points). The latter pattern, but not
the former, would be similar to the attention result (left
panel). These effects of perceptual suppression thus vary
with spatial frequency and are, overall, not statistically
significant.
Possible Influence of the Suppressor
We were initially surprised by the indication that percep-
tual suppression influences threshold elevation in a man-
ner that depends on inducer spatial frequency (Figure 2C,
right panel). In particular, we had not expected any trend
toward strengthened threshold elevation following per-
ceptual suppression, as is apparent at the lowest inducer
spatial frequency (Figure 2C, right panel, leftmost pair of
data points). If we interpret this result in terms of adapta-
tion to the inducing grating, this result would suggest
that the inducing grating elicits stronger threshold ele-
vation when it is not perceived, which disagrees with
previous results (e.g., Blake, Tadin, Sobel, Raissian, &
Chong, 2006). This motivated us to explore an alternative
account. We considered the possibility that detection
thresholds may be influenced, not only by adaptation to
the inducing grating but also by adaptation to the dy-
namic pattern that is presented to the other eye to elicit
perceptual suppression. Such an effect would contribute
to threshold elevation in the perceptual suppression con-
dition, potentially influencing our results.
To test this alternative account, the same observers who
participated in our main experiment performed a control
experiment to estimate the amount of threshold elevation
that a suppressor might cause on its own. Observers
adapted to the dynamic suppressor pattern, but this time
without any inducing grating in the other eye (Figure 3A).
As the dynamic pattern was removed, it was immediately
replaced by a physical grating presented to the other eye,
Figure 3. Control experiment to investigate adaptation to the dynamic
suppressor. (A) Trial structure. Observers adapted to a suppressor in
isolation and then detected a physical grating. This condition was compared
with one in which nothing was shown during the adaptation period.
(B) Detection was impaired following adaptation to the suppressor (black
solid curve) relative to the conditionwithout an adapting stimulus (gray solid
curve). The dotted heavy lines replot the results from our main experiment
(Figure 2C, right), showing detection thresholds following adaptation to an
inducing grating (light dotted curve) and to a perceptually suppressed
inducing grating (dark dotted curve). (C) Approximation of the effect of
perceptual suppression per se on threshold elevation while controlling for
adaptation to the suppressor pattern. Threshold elevation in the perceptual
suppression condition is expressed relative to the control condition
involving adaptation to a suppressor pattern in isolation (dark bars).
Threshold elevation in the condition without perceptual suppression is
expressed relative to the control condition with no adapting pattern
(light bars). This analysis points to consistently more threshold elevation
by a nonsuppressed inducer than by a perceptually suppressed inducer.
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and observers were asked to report detection of this grat-
ing. From an observerʼs perspective, this condition was
indistinguishable from the perceptual suppression condi-
tion of our main experiment, although no afterimages
were involved. The control experiment also included a sec-
ond, baseline condition in which observers viewed just a
blank screen during the adaptation period, and then simi-
larly reported detection of a physical grating. By system-
atically varying the contrast and spatial frequency of the
detection target, we obtained measures of detection
performance at various spatial frequencies, with or with-
out prior adaption to the dynamic pattern.
Figure 3B shows results from the two conditions in this
control experiment. Following adaptation to just the dy-
namic suppressor (black curve), detection thresholds are
increased relative to the baseline condition without an
adapting pattern (gray curve), ANOVA with factors spatial
frequency (n = 3) and condition (n = 2), F = 21.9 and
p ≪ .01 for the latter factor. This difference is largest for
the lowest spatial frequency of the detection target (two-
tailed paired t test; df = 6, t = 6.7, p ≪ .01) and is much
reduced at the two higher spatial frequencies (df = 6,
t= 3.6, p< .05 and df= 6, t= 2.5, p< .05, respectively).
This confirms that the dynamic pattern by itself has the po-
tential to raise detection thresholds.
The result of Figure 3B indicates that, in our main ex-
periment, detection thresholds following perceptual sup-
pression likely reflect adaptation to the inducing grating
as well as adaptation to the suppressor itself. Because we
are interested primarily in adaptation to the inducing
grating and how this is affected when the gratingʼs visibil-
ity is impaired, we reanalyzed the data from our main
experiment to isolate this component. As a first step,
the heavy dotted lines in Figure 3B replot the results
from the conditions in our main experiment that ad-
dressed the effects of perceptual suppression, previously
shown Figure 2C, right panel. The comparison of those
conditions with our control conditions is revealing. The
light dotted curve, associated with the main experiment
condition without perceptual suppression, runs consis-
tently above the gray curve, associated with the control
condition without any adapting stimulus. This indicates
that the inducing grating causes threshold elevation
when it is consciously perceived. The dark dotted curve,
however, which is associated with the main experiment
condition using a perceptually suppressed grating, runs
remarkably close to the black curve that denotes the con-
trol condition with a suppressor in isolation. This indi-
cates that a perceptually suppressed grating causes only
little threshold elevation on top of that caused by the
suppressor itself.
The comparison of Figure 3B strongly suggests that sup-
pressing an image from awareness reduces the amount of
threshold elevation it causes, although this may not always
be obvious when using a suppressor that, itself, causes
threshold elevation. Figure 3C shows an approximation
of the true effect of perceptual suppression on threshold
elevation in our main experiment while attempting to
compensate for adaptation to the suppressor. We recalcu-
lated the threshold elevation data displayed in Figure 2C,
right panel, as the logarithm of the amount of thresh-
old elevation relative to a baseline (log(threshold) −
log(baseline)). This is a standard measure for quantifying
threshold elevation (e.g., Snowden & Hammett, 1996;
Bjørklund & Magnussen, 1981), and it is useful here be-
cause it provides the liberty of choosing different baselines
for the conditions with and without perceptual suppres-
sion. To control for the adapting effects of the suppress-
ing pattern itself, we calculated threshold elevation in
the perceptual suppression condition relative to the con-
trol condition with just a suppressor, whereas threshold
elevation in the no-suppression condition was calculated
relative to the control condition without any adapter.
When isolating the effect of the inducing grating in this
manner threshold elevation is consistently more pro-
nounced without perceptual suppression (light bars)
than with perceptual suppression (dark bars), ANOVA
with factors spatial frequency (n = 3) and suppression
condition (n= 2), F= 11.2 and p< .01 for the latter fac-
tor. This trend is present for all three spatial frequencies
and it is significant for each of the highest two spatial fre-
quencies individually (two-tailed paired t test, df= 6, t=
2.7, p< .05 for 2.0 cycles/degree and df=4, t=2.9, p< .05
for 3.3 cycles/degree).
The values in Figure 3C should not be interpreted quan-
titatively because it is unsure whether and how adaptation
to the suppressor pattern and to the inducing grating inter-
act in the main experiment. Nevertheless, the results of
Figure 3B and C combined corroborate the conclusion
that an inducing grating causes less threshold elevation un-
der conditions of perceptual suppression. This in-
dicates that adaptation to the inducer at phase-insensitive
stages is reduced when the inducer is suppressed from
awareness.
In sum, the left panels of Figure 2 indicate that attending
to a stimulus increases the amount of adaptation caused in
phase-sensitive channels (panel B) as well as in phase-
insensitive channels (panel C). The right panels of Figure 2,
combined with Figure 3, show the same for becoming
aware of the stimulus, which also enhances adaptation in
both types of neural channels.
Predicting Afterimage Durations: A Paradoxical
Effect of Awareness
The subjective strength and duration of an afterimage, two
commonly used psychophysical measures (e.g., Gilroy &
Blake, 2005; Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005; Suzuki & Grabowecky,
2003; Shimojo et al., 2001; Virsu & Laurinen, 1977), depend
on the true contrast of that afterimage as well as on the
observerʼs contrast sensitivity (Leguire & Blake, 1982).
The duration for which an afterimage remains visible, for
instance, is equal to the time it takes for the true afterimage
contrast to fall below an observerʼs contrast detection
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threshold. If true afterimage contrast and contrast detection
threshold are indeed themain factors underlying perceived
afterimage durations, we should be able to predict these
durations from the values measured in our main experi-
ment in the following way.
After an inducing image is removed from the screen, the
true contrast of its afterimage gradually decays. To a first
approximation, the time it takes for this decaying contrast
to fall below an observerʼs contrast detection threshold
is proportional to logðCACDÞ: the logarithm of the ratio
between the initial afterimage contrast CA and the contrast
detection threshold CD. This calculation follows directly
from a simplified scenario in which true afterimage con-
trast starts dropping exponentially upon inducer offset,
causing the afterimage to disappear as soon as its true
contrast drops below the detection threshold. (A more
complete scenario, where both the afterimage and the de-
tection threshold start decaying upon inducer offset, has
too many free parameters to be constrained by our data.)
This calculation is not intended to provide quantitative
duration estimates. It is very useful, however, for making
a comparison between conditions.Whenwe enter the true
afterimage contrasts and contrast detection thresholds of
Figure 2 into this proportionality, we obtain qualitative
predictions of the perceived afterimage durations asso-
ciated with our manipulation of attention or awareness.
These are shown in Figure 4A.
The bottom panels of Figure 4A facilitate compar-
ison by depicting differences between the durations
predicted in various conditions. Comparing the condi-
Figure 4. Perceived afterimage
duration. (A) The top panels
show predictions of perceived
afterimage duration, based on
measured values of true
afterimage contrast and contrast
detection threshold (Figure 2),
and normalized relative to the
“no suppression” condition.
The bottom panels show the
differences between these
predicted values. These
predictions indicate that
attention to the inducer
shortens the resulting
afterimage (left panel), whereas
awareness of the inducer
shortens the afterimage at
high inducer spatial
frequencies, but lengthens
them at low inducer spatial
frequencies (right panel).
(B) These predictions were
confirmed in an experiment
where observers reported
the perceived duration of
afterimages following adaptation
periods identical to those in our
main experiment.
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tion where the inducer is attended with the condition
where it is not attended, our predictions show that at-
tention to the inducer should reduce the duration of
the subsequent afterimage (Figure 4A, left column).
This predicted decrease in duration is counterintuitive,
in the sense that it accompanies an increase in adaptation
(Figure 2). It is, however, in agreement with experimental
findings (Wede & Francis, 2007; Suzuki & Grabowecky,
2003).
For inducers of low spatial frequency, our aware-
ness prediction (right column) is also consistent with
experimental findings (Gilroy & Blake, 2005; Tsuchiya
& Koch, 2005). At those spatial frequencies, awareness
of the inducer is predicted to lengthen the resulting after-
image. The most interesting prediction, however, occurs
for the awareness manipulation at high spatial frequen-
cies. There, our calculations indicate that consciously
perceived inducers should leave briefer afterimages than
perceptually suppressed inducers. This is a paradoxical
outcome that, moreover, is at odds with experimental
findings so far (Gilroy & Blake, 2005; Tsuchiya & Koch,
2005).
To verify our theoretical predictions, we performed an
additional experiment where observers reported the per-
ceived duration of afterimages following exposure to an
inducing grating. Experimental conditions were the same
as in our main experiment, the only difference being that
the nulling task was replaced by a duration judgment.
Figure 4B depicts measured afterimage durations, for
the same seven observers that also participated in our
main experiment plus one additional naive observer. These
measurements confirm the predictions (Figure 4A) made
based on their detection thresholds and true afterimage
contrasts. Attention to the inducer is shown to reduce
the duration of the resulting afterimage (left panel),
ANOVA with factors spatial frequency (n = 4) and atten-
tion condition (n = 2), F = 4.9 and p < .05 for the latter
factor. Awareness of the inducer, on the other hand, is
shown to have different effects at different spatial frequen-
cies (right panel), ANOVA with factors spatial frequency
(n = 4) and awareness condition (n = 2), F = 10.1 and
p ≪ .01 for the interaction between the two factors. In-
deed, awareness of the inducer increases afterimage dura-
tions at low spatial frequencies (right panel; two-tailed
paired t test on the 0.66 cycle/degree data, df = 7,
t = 7.8, p ≪ .1) but reduces afterimage durations at
higher spatial frequencies (two-tailed paired t test on the
3.3 cycle/degree data, df=7, t=2.7, p< .05; the 2.0 cycle/
degree data not significant). Results at an even higher spa-
tial frequency (not shown; 4.6 cycles/degree) closely
matched those at 3.3 cycles/degree, with significant reduc-
tions of afterimage duration following both attention and
awareness (two-sided paired t test, df= 7, t= 2.5, p< .05
for attention and df = 7, t = 3.0, p < .05 for awareness).
The reversal with spatial frequency of the effect of
awareness, observed in the right panels of Figure 4, was
further replicated in an experiment that used a matching
procedure to determine subjective afterimage strength in-
stead of afterimage duration (see Appendix), thus confirm-
ing its robustness.
The agreement between predictions and observations
in Figure 4 supports the idea that the driving factors under-
lying subjective afterimage measures are true afterimage
contrast and contrast detection threshold, and it confirms
that the nulling method of our main experiment success-
fully isolated those factors. In addition, it aids the interpre-
tation of existing work centered on subjective afterimage
measures (see Discussion).
A Dissociation of the Effects of Attention
and Awareness
Our results indicate that attention and awareness have
similar effects on the neural processing of a stimulus. They
both increase the true contrast of its afterimage (Figure 2),
and they both increase the amount of contrast thresh-
old elevation the stimulus causes (Figures 2 and 3). This
indicates that both phase-sensitive channels and phase-
insensitive channels adapt more strongly when their input
is attended as well as when it is consciously perceived.
To investigate the extent to which these qualitative simi-
larities reflect a more fundamental association, we ana-
lyzed individual differences between our observers in the
measured effects. Figure 5A displays the effects of aware-
ness (x-axis) and attention ( y-axis) on true afterimage con-
trast, as measured in our main experiment (Figure 2, left
column). The effect of being aware of the inducing grating
was calculated for each observer simply by subtracting the
true afterimage contrast observed in the perceptual sup-
pression condition from the true afterimage contrast ob-
served in the condition without perceptual suppression,
averaging across spatial frequencies. Attention effects
were calculated in an analogous manner by subtracting
the true contrasts with and without attention.
Figure 5A displays no correlation between the extent to
which awareness affects true afterimage contrast and the
extent to which attention does, thus providing no evi-
dence that the two phenomena share a neural basis at
phase-sensitive stages (linear regression; p = .19 and ad-
justed r2 = 0.18).
Figure 5B shows the outcome of the same analysis,
performed on contrast detection data. The axes depict dif-
ferences between the values of log threshold elevation ob-
served in various conditions, first displayed in Figure 3C.
Contrary to true afterimage contrast, this measure does
reveal a correlation between the effects of attention and
awareness ( linear regression; p = .01 and adjusted
r2 = 0.68). This correlation suggests a direct association
between the effects of attention and awareness in phase-
insensitive channels in our experiment.
The correlation of Figure 5B does not depend on our
use of log threshold elevation as a metric of contrast sen-
sitivity. We observe a similar correlation when using the
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raw contrast detection thresholds of Figure 2, right col-
umn, instead (linear regression; p = .04 and corrected
r2 = 0.51), or when using threshold elevation without tak-
ing the logarithm (linear regression; p= .03 and adjusted
r2 = 0.57).
Before ascribing the lack of correlation in Figure 5A to a
true difference between the effects of attention and aware-
ness at phase-sensitive stages, one needs to consider
whether the null result could, instead, arise from a lack
of statistical power that causes us to overlook a correlation
that is in fact there. As a first step to investigate this issue,
we compared the slopes of the regression lines in Figure 5A
and B and found that they are significantly different
(t test where t ¼ slope1−slope2seslope1−slope2 and df = (n1 − 2) + (n2 −
2), e.g., Glantz, 2005; df= 10, t= 2.54, p< .05). This result
demonstrates that, in any case, our data do provide suffi-
cient statistical power to distinguish the two slopes. As a
second step, we performed an error analysis to determine
the amount of uncertainty on our measurements of true
afterimage contrast and contrast threshold elevation, re-
spectively. As the two regression lines of Figure 5 are each
based on the same amount of data, a lack of statistical
power would be a more likely explanation if the data un-
derlying Figure 5A, where no correlation is evident, were
noisier than the data underlying Figure 5B, which shows a
significant correlation. We therefore performed a boot-
strap analysis in which we randomly drew observations
with replacement from each subject-condition of our orig-
inal data set and then fitted detection curves to these simu-
lated data sets. This analysis revealed an average standard
error on our measure of true afterimage contrast that was
in fact smaller (0.022 contrast units) than the average stan-
dard error on our measure of contrast detection threshold
(0.032 contrast units). In other words, the uncertainty on
themeasure that did yield a positive correlation (detection
threshold) was larger than the uncertainty on the measure
that showed no correlation (true afterimage contrast).
This renders it unlikely that the lack of correlation in the
latter measure is due to a lack of statistical power. As a final
test, we analyzed the data of a control experiment in search
of a correlation between the effects of attention and aware-
ness on true afterimage contrast. In this experiment (orig-
inally performed for a different reason; see Figure A2),
we obtained estimates of true afterimage contrast (but
not detection threshold) from six observers using a dif-
ferent nulling method than the one employed in our main
experiment. The outcome of this experiment was similar
in many respects to that of our main experiment, the rele-
vant point here being that the effects of attention and
awareness on true afterimage contrast again did not show
any sign of correlation (linear regression; p = .50 and
adjusted r2 = −0.10). In sum, the above analyses com-
bined indicate that our data do provide sufficient statistical
power to identify a correlation if it were there, and they
support the interpretation that the lack of correlation in
Figure 5A reflects a true difference in the effects of atten-
tion and awareness in phase-sensitive channels.
DISCUSSION
Exposure to a static image causes an afterimage as well as a
reduction in contrast sensitivity that affects the visibility of
that same afterimage. We devised a method to simulta-
neously determine both the true contrast of an afterimage
as it exists at its neural origin and themagnitude of the sen-
sitivity reduction that impairs afterimage visibility. One
characteristic of afterimages is that their exact spatial lay-
out is dictated by the spatial layout of their inducers. On
Figure 5. Correlation between
the effects of attention and
awareness. (A) The extent to
which awareness of the
inducer influences true
afterimage contrast (x-axis)
shows no correlation with
the extent to which attention
to the inducer does ( y-axis),
when comparing different
observers (signified by
individual dots). (B) In a
similar analysis, the effects of
attention and awareness on
threshold elevation do show
a correlation. This plot
displays differences in log
(threshold elevation),
and similar correlations
are observed when using
alternative contrast
sensitivity measures.
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the basis of this spatial specificity, we argue that after-
images arise in phase-sensitive channels: the only channels
whose responses display sufficient spatial specificity. Con-
sequently, we treat true afterimage contrast as a gauge on
adaptation in phase-sensitive channels. Conversely, we ar-
gue that the visibility of afterimages (but not their true
contrast) is modulated by adaptation in phase-insensitive
channels that are involved in processing the afterimage
after it has formed. Indeed, the fact that the sensitivity re-
duction that an inducer causes can affect the visibility of its
own afterimage implies the involvement of phase-insensitive
channels: the only channels responsive to both the inducer
and the afterimage, which are of opposite phase. We treat
this sensitivity reduction, therefore, as a probe into adapta-
tion of phase-insensitive channels.
Using our method, we provide evidence that suppress-
ing a visual stimulus from awareness lessens the buildup
of adaptation in response to the stimulus, both in phase-
sensitive channels and in phase-insensitive channels. In
addition, our results indicate that diverting the observerʼs
attention away from the stimulus similarly lessens adapta-
tion accumulation in both types of channels. When com-
paring between observers, we find a significant, positive
correlation between the effects of attention and awareness
on threshold elevation but no correlation between their
effects on true afterimage contrast. This suggests that
the signatures of attention and awareness are unrelated
at the level of phase-sensitive channels but not at the level
of phase-insensitive channels.
A Dissociation and a Correlation between the
Effects of Attention and Awareness
The indication that the effects of attention and awareness
are uncorrelated at phase-sensitive stages may reflect the
manner in which awareness is modulated in para-
digms involving interocular suppression. These rely on
a bottom–up conflict between stimuli presented to the
two eyes, which may well engage neural interactions at
early processing stages where monocular signals meet
(e.g., Lee, Blake, & Heeger, 2004; Polonsky et al.,
2000). Similar interactions are not necessarily engaged
by our attention instruction, which arguably draws on
top–down modulation of sensory processing by sig-
nals originating from parietal and frontal areas (e.g.,
Kanwisher & Wojciulik, 2000). As phase-sensitive neu-
rons are primarily found at the same early processing
stages where monocular signals interact (e.g., Levitt
et al., 2001; Hubel & Wiesel, 1962), this may explain the
lack of correlation between the effects of attention and
awareness on phase-sensitive channels suggested by
our experiment.
In contrast, our results do indicate a correlation be-
tween the effects of attention and awareness on adaptation
in phase-insensitive channels. This suggests that our
awareness manipulation results in changes in the activity
of phase-insensitive channels that are akin to the effects
of withdrawing attention. One scenario consistent with
this finding is that the suppressor renders the inducer in-
visible by ways unrelated to attention, after which this in-
visibility causes observers to stop directing attention to the
inducer. An alternative possibility is that themechanismby
which interocular suppression renders targets invisible in-
herently involves interference with attention allocation to
the target. Perhaps, in other words, we observe a correla-
tion because invisibility during interocular suppression is
in fact a type of inattentional blindness. This latter scenario
is consistent with evidence that attentional selection is one
of the main determinants of the contents of conscious
awareness (Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007; Driver & Vuilleumier,
2001; Rees & Lavie, 2001).
Significance for the Interpretation of Single Cell
and fMRI Results
The robust effect of perceptual suppression of an inducing
grating on both true afterimage contrast and contrast de-
tection threshold is indicative of an effect at early stages of
visual processing. Contrast thresholds are modulated by
adaptation of neurons in V1 (Sclar, Lennie, & DePriest,
1989; Movshon & Lennie, 1979). True afterimage contrast,
in turn, is arguably and indicator of neural adaptation in V1
and in subcortical structures such as the LGN, where neu-
rons exhibit much stronger phase sensitivity (White et al.,
2002; Levitt et al., 2001; Xu et al., 2001; Hubel & Wiesel,
1962) than at more advanced processing stages (Levitt
et al., 1994; Maunsell & Van Essen, 1983). This interpreta-
tion fits well with other recent psychophysical studies in-
volving visual aftereffects (e.g., Van Boxtel & Koch, 2009;
Blake et al., 2006; Kanai et al., 2006; Gilroy & Blake, 2005;
Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005) and also with fMRI results that
indicate robust response reduction in early visual areas
during perceptual suppression (Haynes et al., 2005;
Wunderlich et al., 2005; Tong & Engel, 2001; Polonsky
et al., 2000). This view, however, does not dovetail very
well with single-unit recording results from alert, behaving
monkeys, which generally indicate little response modula-
tion in lower visual areas accompanying perceptual sup-
pression (Maier et al., 2008; Wilke et al., 2006; Lehky &
Maunsell, 1996; Leopold & Logothetis, 1996).
Various reasons have been offered to account for the dif-
ferences between fMRI and physiological measurements
during perceptual suppression (Maier et al., 2008), one
being that perceptual suppression may provide an in-
stance where modulatory signals into a brain area become
decoupled from spiking activity (see alsoWilke et al., 2006;
Fries, Schröder, Roelfsema, Singer, & Engel, 2002). As fMRI
BOLD responses have been argued to register synaptic ac-
tivity more than spiking activity (Viswanathan & Freeman,
2007; Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, Trinath, & Oeltermann,
2001), this might cause modulated BOLD activation with-
out proportionate changes in spiking activity. Psycho-
physical results now add an interesting piece to this puzzle:
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Whatever aspect of neural responses is being modulated
in early visual areas during perceptual suppression, that
aspect accounts for a sizable fraction of visual adaptation.
Given that adaptation is a key element of neural informa-
tion processing (Kohn, 2007; Schwartz, Hsu, & Dayan,
2007), psychophysical observations thus underscore that
awareness-related modulation in those early areas is func-
tionally significant and alters the information represented
in those areas. It is conceivable that altered adaptation
during perceptual suppression involves a dissociation be-
tween neural adaptation and neural spiking, similar to that
observed in other situations (e.g., Crowder et al., 2006).
Opposite Effects of Attention and Awareness?
Previous findings have shown opposite effects of attention
and awareness on the perception of subsequent after-
images (Wede & Francis, 2007; Gilroy & Blake, 2005;
Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005; Suzuki & Grabowecky, 2003; see
also Lou, 2001), suggestive of a profound distinction be-
tween attention and awareness (Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007).
Although we successfully replicated the findings that under-
lie this suggestion, our results indicate that attention and
awareness in fact affect afterimage formation in a very sim-
ilar fashion.
The effects of attention and awareness are similar in that
they both raise the true contrast of the resulting afterimage
(Figure 2) as well as raising the amount of contrast thresh-
old elevation the inducer causes (Figures 2 and 3). Oppo-
site effects of attention and awareness are only observed
when using measures that reflect the joint outcome of
both these factors, such as perceived afterimage duration
or subjective afterimage intensity. These measures in-
crease when the true afterimage contrast is raised, but they
decrease when the contrast detection threshold is raised.
Because, in reality, both factors are raised, the relative
strength of the two factors becomes important (Figures 2
and 4). In other words, opposite effects of attention and
awareness on subjective afterimage intensity or duration
are not indicative of opposite effects on a neural level, but
of an altered balance between counteracting effects.
In addition, our results indicate that the documented ef-
fect of awareness, namely, an increase in the perceived
duration and subjective intensity of the afterimage, is lim-
ited to the low inducer spatial frequencies used in the orig-
inal studies (0.5–0.6 cycles/degree in Tsuchiya & Koch,
2005; 1.0 cycle/degree in Gilroy & Blake, 2005). At higher
spatial frequencies, the effect of awareness reverses, caus-
ing a decrease in subjective afterimage intensity and dura-
tion. At these higher spatial frequencies, therefore, the
effects of attention and awareness are in qualitative agree-
ment even at the level of subjective afterimage intensity
and duration (Figure 4 and Appendix). In our experiments,
the effect of awarenessmanipulations is influenced by adap-
tation to the suppressor, particularly when the inducer has
a low spatial frequency (Figures 2–4). The importance of
this component may depend on factors such as the spatial
frequency content of the suppressor (e.g., Blakemore &
Campbell, 1969), and a control experiment by Tsuchiya
and Koch (2005) provides evidence against a key role of
adaptation to the suppressor at their stimulus settings (their
Figure 3). Nevertheless, our results demonstrate that mul-
tiple components contribute to the effects of perceptual
suppression on subsequent afterimage perception and
therefore call for caution when interpreting these effects.
Previous studies have already inferred that augmented
contrast threshold elevation is responsible for the reduc-
tion in subjective afterimage duration and intensity follow-
ing attention to the inducer (Wede & Francis, 2007; Suzuki
& Grabowecky, 2003). Like ours, those studies have argued
for a distinction between what we are calling phase-sensitive
channels and phase-insensitive channels in interpreting
such effects. Our work builds on this notion and provides
an empirical confirmation that altered threshold elevation
is responsible for subjective afterimage weakening follow-
ing attention. In addition, we provide direct measurements
of changes in threshold elevation associated with manipula-
tions of attention and awareness as well as of accompanying
changes in true afterimage contrast that in previous work
remained obscured by changes in detection threshold.
Conclusion
Our results indicate that manipulations of attention and
awareness have similar effects on adaptation in visual
neurons while explaining why previous findings suggest
that they do not. Our results also show that the impres-
sion from physiological work, that awareness-related re-
sponse modulation is minimal in lower visual areas, is
not borne out in psychophysical adaptation measures,
which indicate that functionally significant response
modulation occurs in those areas. In spite of an overall
similarity in the effects of attention and awareness, we
observe a direct correlation only in the measure that
reflects adaptation in phase-insensitive channels. In con-
trast, our data indicate that adaptation of phase-sensitive
channels is differentially modulated by attention and by
awareness. These results are consistent with a dissocia-
tion of attention and awareness in early, but not later, vi-
sual areas.
APPENDIX
Derivation of an Equation for the Detection Curve
Our approach assumes that the nuller image and the neu-
ral source of the afterimage are combined at some phase-
sensitive stage, after which their combined signal passes
through a phase-insensitive stage that may modulate visi-
bility, a scenario schematically depicted in Figure A1A. This
choice for a serial organization was motivated by the fact
that predominantly phase-sensitive stages precede predo-
minantly phase-insensitive stages in the visual hierarchy
(e.g., White et al., 2002; Levitt et al., 2001, 1994; Maunsell
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&Van Essen, 1983). Even within V1, where phase-sensitive
simple cells and phase-insensitive complex cells are both
common, the response profiles of complex cells arise from
phase-sensitive inputs from LGN and from V1 simple cells,
thus roughly maintaining the same hierarchical sequence
(Rust, Schwartz, Movshon, & Simoncelli, 2005; Alonso &
Martinez, 1998; Ferster & Lindström, 1983; Movshon,
Thompson, & Tolhurst, 1978).
In standard signal detection theory, a sensory signal is
represented as a distribution on some intensity axis, which
describes the probabilities associated with all possible in-
tensities the signal can take on (e.g., Green& Swets, 1988).
Under the simplest assumption that the signal from the
nuller image and the signal at the afterimage source are
combined linearly, their combined signal can be repre-
sented as a Gaussian distribution whose mean equals the
absolute difference between the expected values of the
two constituent signals (Figure A1B, left). We take the dif-
ference here because the nuller image and the afterimage
have opposite polarity.
pðIÞ ¼ φ∣μN−μA ∣;σðIÞ: ð1Þ
Here p(I) denotes the probability density at intensity I,
φ is a Gaussian distribution, μN and μA indicate the ex-
pected values of the nuller intensity and the signal inten-
sity at the afterimage source, respectively, and the standard
deviation σ quantifies the amount of uncertainty in the
combined signal.
We again follow standard signal detection theory by
positing a decision criterion D on this axis that denotes
the intensity above which the observer reports seeing a
stimulus and below which he or she reports not seeing
a stimulus (Figure A1B, left). The probability of detection
is then represented by the area under the distribution to
the right of this criterion value (shaded area in Figure A1B,
left) or 1 minus the area left of the decision criterion:
PðμN;DÞ ¼ 1−Φ∣μN−μA ∣;σðDÞ ð2Þ
Here P(μN, D) indicates detection probability for a given
nuller intensity μN and criterion intensity D. Φ(D) denotes
a cumulative Gaussian distribution function at intensity D,
which, by definition, equals the integral of the accompany-
ing Gaussian function from minus infinity to D.
In our experiment,we vary the contrast of the nulling grat-
ing. To calculate detection probability as a function of the
combination of this nuller contrast and the contrast detec-
tion threshold, we replace the arbitrary intensity units in
Equation 2 with physical intensity measures of contrast:
PðCN;CDÞ ¼ 1−Φ∣CN−CA ∣;σðCDÞ ð3Þ
Here CN and CA denote the contrast of the nuller and the
true contrast of the afterimage (at its source in phase-
sensitive channels), respectively, and CD is the contrast
detection threshold. We obtain our measures of detec-
tion threshold and true afterimage contrast by fitting this
Figure A1. Derivation of a
detection curve. (A) We assume
a serial organization, where the
nuller image and the neural
source of the afterimage are first
combined at phase-sensitive
stages, after which their
combined signal passes
through phase-insensitive
stages. (B, left) The combined
signal can be represented as a
Gaussian distribution on an
intensity axis, centered on
the absolute difference between
the mean intensities of the
nuller signal and the afterimage
signal (dashed vertical line).
The probability of detection
is then denoted by the area
under the distribution (shaded
gray) that lies to the right of
a decision criterion (vertical
line). (B, right) Replacing
abstract “intensity” with physical
contrast we obtain a curve
that denotes this probability
as a function of nuller contrast.
We obtain estimates of the
true afterimage contrast and the
detection threshold by fitting
this curve to our data.
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equation to our experimental data, with free parameters
CA, CD, and σ.
Response Bias
If cognitive rather than sensory factors cause differences in
decision criterion between conditions, this amounts to a
response bias. When signal detection theory is applied to
detection of physical stimuli, sensory and cognitive factors
are separated by including blank trials in the experiment,
during which no stimulus is presented (e.g., Green &
Swets, 1988). A systematic approach using blank trials is
not possible here because we do not know which nuller
contrast will exactly cancel the afterimage on a given trial,
as would be required for a signal strength of zero. An alter-
native kind of blank trial, lacking both the afterimage and
the nuller image, is only informative in the condition involv-
ing a suppressor, as observers would notice the absence
of an inducer in the remaining conditions. Our perceptual
suppression condition did in fact involve randomly inter-
spersed blank trials of this second kind, and the fact that
our observers erroneously reported detecting a grating in
only three of 103 such blank trials instills confidence that
they reported perception accurately.
Nevertheless, we were careful to examine the possibility
that cognitive rather than sensory factors could explain our
results. We found several aspects of our data that are in-
consistent with this idea.
Our data show that attention to the inducer elevates
subsequent detection thresholds (Figure 2). Furthermore,
the prediction that subjective afterimage duration would
be reduced by this threshold elevation was confirmed ex-
perimentally (Figure 4). This was true for both our naive
observers and our nonnaive observers. An explanation in
terms of response bias would involve the assumption that
attention to the inducer biases observers to report subse-
quent afterimages to be briefer. It is known, however, that
observers do not expect afterimages to be briefer after at-
tending to the inducer (Suzuki & Grabowecky, 2003).
Moreover, the same attention-mediated reduction in sub-
jective afterimage duration has been observed in experi-
ments similar to ours that used measures that do not
depend on criterion (Suzuki & Grabowecky, 2003), ren-
dering it unlikely that criterion is the cause in our case.
Our observations regarding the effects of perceptual
suppression of the inducer on detection threshold are also
at odds with bias-based explanations. Our raw measure of
detection threshold (Figure 2) is consistent with our ob-
servations on perceived afterimage duration (Figure 4).
Both measures show opposite effects in the perceptual
suppression condition, depending on the spatial frequency
of the inducer. The hypothesis that these measures reflect
a response bias thus requires the assumption that per-
ceptual suppression of the inducer causes opposite biases,
depending on the spatial frequency of the inducer. We see
no justification for this assumption.
No Evidence for an Influence of Phase-sensitive
Channels on Threshold Elevation
We performed a control experiment to verify that thresh-
old elevation has an equal influence on the left leg and the
Figure A2. Test for asymmetric
effects of threshold elevation.
(A) Using inducers and nulling
gratings identical to our main
experiment, observers judged
the spatial phase of the
nuller–afterimage combination
(left), resulting in a systematic
shift in reported phase with
increasing nuller contrast
(right). (B) If contrast threshold
elevation specifically affected
visibility of nuller–afterimage
combinations that share the
spatial phase of the inducer, this
would result in an asymmetric
response curve (left). No such
asymmetry is detectable in our
data (right).
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right leg of the U-shaped curve and thus does not change
the position of the curveʼs center. This is related to the
notion that threshold elevation in our paradigm reflects
adaptation of phase-insensitive channels. A significant
contribution of phase-sensitive channels to threshold eleva-
tion could result in a larger influence of threshold elevation
on the right leg of theU-shaped curve because in that region
the phase of the nuller–afterimage combination matches
the phase of the inducer to which the channels adapted.
The trial sequence in this experiment was almost identi-
cal to that of the main experiment, using the same inducers
and nulling stimuli (Figure A2A, left panel). Our manipula-
tions of attention and awarenesswere also the same, andwe
used the same three spatial frequencies. Insteadof perform-
ing a detection task, however, our six observers (five naive;
all were participants of the main experiment) were in-
structed to report the spatial phase of the nuller–afterimage
combination. Following Kelly and Martinez-Uriegas (1993),
we added a thin red marker line through the center of the
nulling grating, thus reducing the task to a report of which
side of the line was flanked by the darker grating band (Fig-
ure A2A, left panel). We found that we could facilitate this
judgment further by orienting the stimulus gratings parallel
to the imaginary line connecting the stimulus center to fixa-
tion. Otherwise the stimuli in this experiment were identi-
cal to those of the main experiment.
The right panel of Figure A2A displays a typical response
pattern obtained by varying the contrast of the nulling grat-
ing. The location along the curve where the observer is
equally likely to report either side of the line to be flanked
by the darker band marks the point where nuller contrast
and true afterimage contrast are equal (CN = CA).
If threshold elevation had a stronger impact on the vis-
ibility of nuller–afterimage combinations that have the
same spatial phase as the inducer, this would specifically
affect the right side of the response curve, both in our
main experiment and in this control experiment. In the
control experiment, this would compel observers to guess
their answer more often for those nuller–afterimage com-
binations specifically, thus resulting in a shallower slope
of the rightward section of the curve. Figure A2B, left panel,
illustrates this scenario.
To test for this kind of asymmetry in the response curve,
we fitted our data with a combination of two half cumula-
tive Gaussian functions, joined together at their means
(Figure A2B, left panel). Free parameters were the stan-
dard deviation of the left half section (σL), the standard de-
viation of the right half section (σR), and the location of the
mean. Although the idea of a sharp kink separating the left
and right section of the response curve is probably a sim-
plification, any asymmetry should show up as a difference
between σR and σL. Specifically, an influence of phase-
sensitive channels on detection threshold in this experi-
ment should show up as σR > σL.
The right panel of Figure A2B displays the distribution
of all differences between σR and σL for our subject con-
ditions. There is no sign that the distribution would be
skewed toward values greater than zero, as would be
Figure A3. The effect of
perceptually suppressing the
inducer on the subjective
strength of the afterimage.
(A) Trial structure. Two
inducers were presented on
opposite sides of fixation,
one perceptually suppressed,
and the other visible. Observers
judged which of the resulting
afterimages was stronger.
Stimuli were sine waves
windowed with a Gaussian
aperture (σ = 0.68°), presented
at 2.5° eccentricity. (B) Typical
response pattern as a function
of the contrast of the visible
inducer (left panel). When the
visible inducer and the invisible
inducer are of equal contrast,
the afterimage of the visible
inducer is usually judged to be
stronger for low inducer spatial
frequencies, but the converse is
true for high inducer spatial
frequencies (right panel). This
reversal of the effect of
perceptual suppression on
subjective strength is analogous
to the reversal found with
perceived duration (Figure 4).
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expected if σR > σL, and the distribution mean is not sig-
nificantly different from zero (two-sided t test; df=61 after
removing 10 nonconverging fits, t = 1.4, p = .18). This
indication that threshold elevation does not differentially
affect either side of the response curve in our control ex-
periment renders it unlikely that it does in our main ex-
periment, which used the exact same stimuli. It thus
supports the idea that phase-sensitive channels do not sig-
nificantly influence threshold elevation in our tasks.
Subjective Afterimage Strength
Like perceived afterimage duration, the subjective inten-
sity of an afterimage depends on a combination of true
afterimage contrast and contrast sensitivity. Afterimage
weakening following perceptual suppression of the in-
ducer has previously been reported using a subjective
duration measure (Gilroy & Blake, 2005) as well as using
a subjective intensity measure (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005).
We found that the effect on perceived duration reverses
with spatial frequency (Figure 4) and wished to test
whether the same applies to subjective strength.
Our trial sequence followed that of Tsuchiya and Koch
(2005). It is illustrated in Figure A3A. Two inducing grat-
ings were presented on opposite sides of fixation, one
being perceptually suppressed whereas the other one re-
mained visible. Following a 4-sec adaptation period, ob-
servers reported which afterimage appeared stronger:
the one left by the visible inducer or the one left by the
invisible inducer. As in our main experiment, we used in-
ducing gratings with various spatial frequencies.
Figure A3B, left panel, shows a typical response pat-
tern, obtained by systematically varying the contrast of
the visible inducer (the contrast of the perceptually sup-
pressed inducer remained fixed at 0.52 Michelson). The
proportion of trials that the afterimage of the visible in-
ducer was judged as stronger increased with the contrast
of the visible inducer. Our variable of interest is this pro-
portion for the situation where the visible inducer and
the perceptually suppressed inducer have physically equal
contrasts.
This proportion for physically equal inducers is shown
in the right panel of Figure A3B, averaged across seven ob-
servers (four naive; three also participated in our main ex-
periment). For inducers of low spatial frequency, the
fraction lies above 0.5 (two-sided t test, df = 6, t = 17.5,
p ≪ 0.01 for the 0.2 cycle/degree condition), indicating
that perceptual suppression of the inducer subjectively
weakens the resulting afterimage. At higher spatial fre-
quencies, however, this effect reverses (two-sided t test,
df= 6, t= 2.8, p< .05 for the 3.0 cycle/degree condition;
intermediate condition not significant), showing that after-
images of perceptually suppressed inducers are subjectively
stronger. The same reversal we observed for perceived
duration (Figure 4B) thus applies to subjective intensity
as well.
Given that subjective afterimage intensity depends on
suprathreshold contrast sensitivity rather than on the level
of the contrast detection threshold itself, we cannot pro-
vide a direct prediction of subjective afterimage intensity
by combining measurements of true afterimage contrast
and contrast detection threshold, as we could in the case
of perceived afterimage duration (Figure 4). Nevertheless,
subjective afterimage intensity is comparable to perceived
afterimage duration in the respect that it depends on a
combination of true afterimage contrast and contrast sen-
sitivity. One implication of this is that adaptation to the
suppressor pattern, an important factor explaining why
perceptual suppression reduces perceived afterimage
duration at low spatial frequencies (Figure 3), is also a
likely contributor to the reduction of subjective afterimage
intensity that we observe at low spatial frequencies in the
present experiment (Figure A3).
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